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Abstract We demonstrate how adversaries with large computing resources
can break Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols which employ a par-
ticular message authentication code suggested previously. This authentication
code, featuring low key consumption, is not Information-Theoretically Secure
(ITS) since for each message the eavesdropper has intercepted she is able to
send a different message from a set of messages that she can calculate by finding
collisions of a cryptographic hash function. However, when this authentication
code was introduced it was shown to prevent straightforward Man-In-The-
Middle (MITM) attacks against QKD protocols.
In this paper, we prove that the set of messages that collide with any
given message under this authentication code contains with high probabil-
ity a message that has small Hamming distance to any other given message.
Based on this fact we present extended MITM attacks against different ver-
sions of BB84 QKD protocols using the addressed authentication code; for
three protocols we describe every single action taken by the adversary. For
all protocols the adversary can obtain complete knowledge of the key, and
for most protocols her success probability in doing so approaches unity. Since
the attacks work against all authentication methods which allow to calculate
colliding messages, the underlying building blocks of the presented attacks
expose the potential pitfalls arising as a consequence of non-ITS authenti-
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cation in QKD-postprocessing. We propose countermeasures, increasing the
eavesdroppers demand for computational power, and also prove necessary and
sufficient conditions for upgrading the discussed authentication code to the
ITS level.
Keywords Quantum Key Distribution · Information-Theoretic Security ·
Message Authentication · Collision Attacks · Man-in-the-Middle attack
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic key-agreement proto-
col. The principles of QKD and particularly the very first proposal (Bennett-
Brassard-84 or BB84 [6]) are well-known. Still we prefer to start with a short
outline in order to provide the reader with a very general picture leaving more
in-depth descriptions for the technical part of the paper (see Sections 3.4–3.6).
Any version of QKD consists of two phases: quantum communication (and
measurements), and classical post processing. The quantum communication
phase typically uses states of light. In the original approach by Bennett and
Brassard polarized photons have been put forward to this end. In the case of
BB84 the quantum communication phase starts with the generation of a ran-
dom bitsequence, by one of the users of the system (Alice). This bitsequence is
to be used as raw material for the key. Alice encodes it at random into either
a horizontal-vertical polarization basis, e.g. horizontal – 1 and vertical – 0, or
analogously into a ±45◦ polarization basis. The other user (Bob) decodes the
bits, selecting randomly either horizontal-vertical polarization or ±45◦ polar-
ization as a measurement basis. In case of perfect communication, the bits of
Alice and Bob would agree whenever they have chosen identical coding and
decoding bases. An eavesdropper (Eve) would need to guess what coding basis
is used (in the simplest intercept-resend attack) to intercept Alice’s signal in
a measurement basis and resend the result to Bob in the same basis. There-
fore whenever Alice’s and Bob’s encoding/decoding choices coincide, there is
a 50% chance that Eve guesses wrongly. Thus as consequence of the quantum
uncertainty relation for polarization she will destroy the information poten-
tially shared by Alice and Bob and render the bitstings of the two-parties
uncorrelated.
After the quantum communication phase has ended, Alice and Bob start
the classical post processing through a process called sifting. They compare
what encoding/decoding bases they used for each bit, and keep only those bit
values for which these bases match. This will remove 50% of the raw key bits
on average. The next step is to perform reconciliation, or error-correction, so
that channel noise can be removed. This step will also indicate if there is an
eavesdropper on the channel. Typically, the users have agreed on an accept-
able noise level, and abort the protocol if the noise level is too high. Whether
Alice’s and Bob’s keys have been successfully reconciled is determined in the
confirmation step. A subsequent step is privacy amplification, sacrificing some
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of the newly established key material to decrease exponentially Eve’s knowl-
edge on the final key, the assumption being that any channel noise is due to
(some moderate level of) eavesdropping by Eve. The final post-processing step
is authentication to verify the origin and correctness of the classical communi-
cation messages, used in the post processing phase. This sequence may differ
in detail and order in different QKD protocols, but in principle all separate
steps need to be present in one way or another.
The authentication step is the focus of this paper; the outstanding property
of QKD is that it is an Information-Theoretically Secure (ITS) and universally
composable (UC) protocol given that its classical communication is performed
over an authentic channel (note that all key-agreement protocols are insecure
over non-authentic channels). Thus QKD is a very powerful cryptographic
primitive but in order to be useful for practical key agreement purposes it
must be composed with an independent primitive enforcing the mentioned
requirement for authenticity of classical communication.
The standard cryptographic approach ensuring authenticity of communi-
cation messages against malicious attackers is to use a message authentication
code (MAC) [21]. A convenient class of MACs are systematic MACs which
replace the original message with a concatenation of the message itself and
an additional tag which is the image of a keyed hash function applied to the
message. It is well-known that Strongly Universal2 (SU2), and more generally
Almost Strongly Universal2 (ASU2) hashing (see E) is an ITS primitive that
can be used to calculate systematic MAC tags.
1.1 Related work
Very recently authentication based on ASU2 hashing was explicitly shown [26]
to be also UC (a fact that has been used implicitly for quite some time). There-
fore UC message authentication with ASU2 hashing can be composed with UC
quantum key distribution over authentic channels to form a UC (quantum-
classical) key agreement protocol over non-authentic channels. Thus, ASU2
hashing is sufficient for the authentication of the classical messages exchanged
during any QKD protocol. However, although composing two UC primitives
is sufficient for getting a UC composed protocol this is not a priori neces-
sary as in principle it is not excluded that it can be shown directly that the
final protocol is UC. In this sense it might still be possible that QKD over
non-authentic channels can be made secure without relying on ASU2 hashing.
Alternatives using weaker authentication have been proposed, and this paper
focuses on the method of Ref. [24], that puts forward a hash function which
is a composition of an (inner) known public hash function (like SHA) and an
(outer) SU2 function. It was proven that QKD using this authentication is
secure against an eavesdropper that attempts to break the protocol using a
straightforward ”man-in-the-middle” (MITM) attack, as defined below. Later,
in Refs. [1, 8] it was observed that an eavesdropper can apply more advanced
strategies than a straightforward MITM and get a significant leverage by be-
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ing able to break QKD with particular realizations of post-processing. It has,
however, been argued [24, 25] that this weakness occurs only in specific post
processing realizations, while in practical (or generic) ones the proposed eaves-
dropping techniques remain inadequate.
1.2 New results
In this paper we use the adversarial approaches of [1, 8], extend them sig-
nificantly to full scale eavesdropping strategies, and demonstrate in detail
how to break several explicit QKD protocols, that employ the authentica-
tion method of Ref. [24], under the assumptions that the adversary possesses
unbounded computation resources and in some cases quantum memory. The
general attack-pattern is a sophisticated (interleaving) MITM attack, in which
the adversary (Eve) carries out independent protocols with the legitimate par-
ties (Alice and Bob). In doing so Eve manages to modify her respective pro-
tocol messages such that these collide with those of Alice and Bob under the
first part of the authentication of Ref. [24]. Depending on the protocol vari-
ants (e.g., immediate vs. delayed authentication), the different attacks which
we study address sifting, error correction, confirmation, and privacy amplifi-
cation or only some of these steps. These techniques can be used to break a
very broad class of post-processing protocol realizations which include those
routinely used in practical implementations. With significant probability that
in most attacks approaches unity Eve shares a key with the legitimate parties.
We also consider some countermeasures, which consist of modifications of
the two-step authentication mechanism. These modifications result in a range
of complications to Eve: (i) increasing Eve’s computational load substantially,
(ii) forcing her to do considerable online computation rather than offline; and
(iii) depriving her of any attack potential by finally re-establishing ITS for
the modified construction. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for ITS
with this construction; that the conditions are sufficient is already known from
earlier results, but that the conditions are necessary is, as far as we know, a
new result.
1.3 Structure of the paper
Section 2 contains a motivation on why authentication is needed in QKD,
shortly reviews message authentication codes and Universal hashing, and gives
a more detailed description of the authentication method under study here.
Section 3 introduces the attack vectors and then details three different QKD
protocols and attacks against them in a step-by-step fashion. In Tables 2 and
3 we summarize the attacks and the gained knowledge on the key for each of
them, as well as for a number of further protocol versions. Section 4 discusses
how the security of the authentication method can be improved and presents a
theorem that gives necessary and sufficient conditions for ITS of the modified
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method. The conclusions and outlook are given in Section 5. The Appendices
contain technical proofs and summarize some definitions of Universal hash
function families.
2 Authentication in QKD
The need for authentication becomes clear if we consider for a moment the
opposite case, i.e. an “unprotected” channel that allows arbitrary modification
of messages in transit.
2.1 Man-in-the-middle attacks and Message Authentication Codes
The unprotected channel will enable a straightforward “man-in-the-middle”
(MITM) attack:
Definition 1 (straightforward man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack) In
the straightforward man-in-the-middle attack the eavesdropper (Eve) builds or
buys a pair of QKD devices identical to those of the legitimate parties (Alice
and Bob) and cuts “in the middle” the quantum and classical communication
channels connecting Alice and Bob. She now connects each of her devices to
the “loose ends” of the quantum and classical channels and launches two inde-
pendent QKD sessions, one with Alice and the other with Bob. Eve effectively
pretends to be Bob to Alice and Alice to Bob. Eventually she shares a (differ-
ent) key with each of the legitimate parties which allows her to communicate
with them independently. If Alice sends an encrypted message to Bob, Eve
can intercept the message and decrypt it, encrypt it with the key she shares
with Bob, and send it to Bob.
Alice and Bob never come to realize that the security of their communica-
tion is completely lost. This is completely analogous to the classic MITM at-
tack against the unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [21,
Chap. 12.9.1]. Obviously, any (classic or quantum) key agreement protocol that
has no proper authentication (or integrity check) of messages exchanged be-
tween the communicating parties can be broken with a similar impersonation
attack.
So ideally an adversary should not be able to insert messages into the
channel, and moreover messages sent by one legitimate user to the other are
always delivered and are not modified. However, there are no a-priori authentic
communication channels. Appending a so-called Message Authentication Code
(MAC) to each communication message can mimic an authentic channel, but
cannot guarantee delivery of messages, as these can in practice always be
blocked.
Definition 2 (Message Authentication Code (MAC)[21]) A Message
Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm is a family of functions hK parameter-
ized by a secret key K with the following properties: (i) given a message x and
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a key K, the MAC value hK(x) (also called tag) should be easy to compute,
(ii) it maps a message x of arbitrary finite bitlength to a tag hK(x) of fixed
bitlength n, and (iii) given a description of the function family h, for every
fixed allowable value of K it must be computation-resistant. The last property
means that given zero or more message-tag pairs (xi, hK(xi)) it is computa-
tionally infeasible to compute any message-tag pair (x, hK(x)) for any new
input x 6= xi without knowing K.
Normally, MACs are either based on (a) cryptographic hash functions (e.g.
HMAC-SHA-256 based on SHA-256), on (b) block cipher algorithms (e.g.
AES-CMAC based on AES), or on (c) Universal2 hashing (see E). Message au-
thentication codes based on (a) or (b) typically use one key for many messages,
and offer computational security, i.e. they can only be broken with sufficient
computing power (or when a hidden weakness of the algorithm is detected).
2.2 Universal hashing and UC security
MACs based on Universal2 hashing have to use one (new) key per message,
but offer information-theoretic security which is independent of the adversary’s
computing power. In more detail, for SU2 hash functions, a random guess of the
MAC tag is provably the best possible attack, while -ASU2 hash functions still
provide a strict upper bound (namely ) on the attacker’s success probability
to substitute an observed message-tag pair with another valid message-tag
pair (substitution attack) or to insert a valid message-tag pair.
Universal hashing was originally proposed by Wegman and Carter [12, 33].
It was identified as an appropriate match for QKD, as Wegman-Carter’s and
later constructions [18, 20, 30, 31] consume relatively low amount of key. The
aim is to have less key consumption than the key generation in a typical
QKD session [7], so that each session can reserve a portion of its output for
authentication of the subsequent one. Then, the process only needs to be kick-
started by an initial, one-time, pre-distributed secret.
Security analysis of QKD (see, e.g., Ref. [29] and references therein for a
recent overview) has typically been based on the requirement that the classical
post-processing communication is secured by a MAC based on Universal hash-
ing, to upper bound an adversary’s chances to modify or insert messages with-
out getting detected. In addition UC-security definitions for QKD have been
established [4, 5, 22, 27]. As a consequence combining the two ε-UC-secure
protocols QKD and ASU2 authentication yields a joint, UC-secure key grow-
ing mechanism over non-authentic classical channels (see [26]). Thus, MACs
based on ASU2 hashing are sufficient for security, but it is an open question
whether they are also necessary, and what security would be obtained for other
alternatives.
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2.3 The non-ITS authentication mechanism of Ref. [24]
The authentication mechanism proposed in Ref. [24] aimed to consume less key
than ASU2 authentication. The intended goal is a positive key balance of the
combination QKD plus authentication even in realizations that use (relatively)
short blocks in the post processing step. Note that later experimental progress
has made these objectives not so relevant, as short key blocks are no longer
necessary from an implementation perspective [28]. Still, a complete security
analysis of the authentication mechanism of [24] is intriguing from a theoretical
point of view as the mechanism has interesting properties not shared by any
of the methods mentioned above.
To start with, we summarize the proposal of Ref. [24] and introduce some
notation (see also Table 1). The proposal relies on a two-step hash function
evaluation: t = gK(m) := hK(f(m)), where f : M → Z is a publicly known
hash function and hK : Z → T belongs to an SU2 hash function family H (see
E). Here, M is the set of messages to be authenticated, Z is an intermediate
set of strings, and T is the set of tags with |M|  |Z| > |T |.
2.3.1 Insertion of messages is ruled out
Now assume that Eve attempts to calculate or guess the tag for a fixed message
mE that she wants to insert. In that case she has a success probability of
1/|T | (irrespective of her computing power). This is because the key K which
identifies the SU2 hash function is not known to her. Thus, the authentication
mechanism is (first-)preimage resistant, i.e. knowledge of the authentication
tag alone does not allow to find messages yielding the same tag.
2.3.2 Substitution with given messages is ruled out
Let us further assume, Eve has intercepted a (valid) message-tag pair (mA, t)
from Alice and wants to substitute it with her fixed message mE and some
tag. Then Eve’s chances increase slightly because she now has access to the
intermediate value f(mA), and can check if f(mA) = f(mE). If there is a
collision, Eve knows that (mE, t) is a valid message-tag pair and can just send
this, otherwise she guesses the tag as above. The total probability of success
is now bounded by the guessing probability plus the collision probability, and
assuming that mA is random to Eve and that f is a good hash function,
the collision probability is low (for details see [24]). So this two-step authen-
tication works well in a situation when Eve is given a fixed message mE to
generate the tag for. One immediate consequence is that Eve cannot perform
the straightforward MITM attack (cf. Definition 1) with significant success
probability since she would need to generate tags for messages mE from her
devices without knowledge of K, for which case the above bound applies.
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2.3.3 The weakness
However, one should note that using the intercepted message-tag pair (mA, t)
and enough computational power, Eve can in principle search for other preim-
ages of t under f . If she can find (at least) one message m˜E such that f(mA) =
f(m˜E) then hK(f(m
A)) = hK(f(m˜
E)) and therefore (m˜E, t) is a valid message-
tag pair for any key K. She can now replace mA with m˜E with success prob-
ability of 100%. The question now is if this (one of these) m˜E can be used
in place of the message mE. It would seem that, if Eve strictly follows the
appropriate QKD protocol (random settings, best possible bit error rate, . . . ),
this is not possible.
However, Eve is not forced to follow the precise requirements of the QKD
protocol [1]; she only needs to make it seem to Alice and Bob that she does
so. For example, Eve does not need to use random settings (e.g. preparation
bases and raw keys), or even correctly send all settings she used. If it helps
her, she can use a fixed sequence of settings or report other settings for some
qubits than the ones actually used.
An early suggestion [8] was to select the privacy amplification map care-
fully, rather than generating it randomly. This would give Eve a shared key
with Bob, but not with Alice. Later, as mentioned above, it was observed that
Eve may deviate from the QKD protocol in several places [1]. If Eve uses a
fixed sequence of settings (e.g. measurement and preparation bases) on the
quantum channel this would enable her to do the calculations for finding m˜E
offline. If Eve sends the wrong settings for some of the qubits this will allow
her to choose from several m˜E, to get a collision. This would constitute the
basis for a sophisticated MITM attack that can break simplified QKD proto-
cols. In these simplified protocols, the breaches could be closed by relatively
straightforward countermeasures [25], but the security of the standard and/or
hardened protocols remained an open issue. We aim to settle this in the present
paper.
3 Attacks against non-ITS authentication in QKD
In this section, we give detailed descriptions of four different attacks on three
different explicit QKD protocols. We also give an overview of the effective-
ness of this kind of attacks against other QKD protocols, and for different
types of resources available to Eve. In each case, the essence of the attack is to
intercept a valid message-tag pair (sent by Alice or Bob) and—using large com-
putational resources and/or leveraging weaknesses of the public hash function
algorithm—find further preimages of the tag (messages that hash to the same
hash value as the intercepted message) that are used by the eavesdropper.
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3.1 Probability for finding hash collisions in a set of messages
Assume that Eve has intercepted a message-tag pair (mA, t) from Alice. The
following lemma gives a lower bound for the probability that (under a mild
assumption) a set M of messages contains at least a single message mE that
collides with mA, i.e. hK(f(m
E)) = t.
Lemma 1 Let us assume that f maps all messages in M randomly onto Z.
Then the probability that at least one of the messages in M is validated by the
given tag t = hK(f(m
A)) is
Psucccoll = Pr
{∃mE ∈M : hK(f(mE)) = t)} > 1− exp (−|M||Z|−1) .
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in A. Since no assumptions on the computa-
tional power of Eve are imposed, she will be able to find with probability Psucccoll
such an mE. Note, that |M| = |Z| is sufficient to get Psucccoll > 0.63.
3.2 Probability for finding a hash collision with small Hamming distance to a
given message
Assume that Eve has intercepted a message-tag pair (mA, t) from Alice. The
following corollary of Lemma 1 states that (under a mild assumption) for any
fixed message mE, that Eve would like to send, there exists with probability
almost 1 a message m˜E, such that (i) m˜E is almost identical to mE, i.e. m˜E has
small Hamming distance to mE, and (ii) (m˜E, t) will be accepted as authentic,
i.e. hK(f(m˜
E)) = t.
Corollary 1 Let B be the closed ball of all messages m having a Hamming
distance to mE not exceeding w:
B = {m : dH(m,mE) ≤ w} ,
and let us assume that f maps all messages in B randomly onto Z. Then the
probability that at least one of the messages in B is validated by the given tag
t = hK(f(m
A)) is
Psucccoll = Pr
{∃m˜E ∈ B : hK(f(m˜E)) = t)} > 1− exp (−|B||Z|−1) .
For simplicity we can loosen the bound and replace |B| by ( `w) < |B|, where `
is the length of the binary message mE.
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in B. Since no assumptions on the com-
putational power of Eve are imposed, she will be able to find with probability
Psucccoll such an m˜E. For typical parameters, e.g. |Z| = 2256, and ` = 212 (213,
214, 215, 216, 217), a Hamming distance w = 32 (28, 25, 22, 20, 19) is sufficient
to reach a success probability of 99.9%.
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3.2.1 Attacking the sifting stage – hiding in the noise
Let us assume that during the sifting stage the legitimate parties will exchange
messages that contain one bit per preparation/measurement basis (time slot).
Let us assume further that Eve can successfully attack the protocol (as dis-
cussed below), if she can substitute such a message, say mA, with a sifting
message of her choice, say mE. From Corollary 1 it follows that if Eve replaces
mA with m˜E instead of mE, she will introduce at this step (at most) an addi-
tional error  = w/` ≈ 0.78% (0.34%, 0.15%, 0.067%, 0.031%, 0.014%) (with
parameters from above; in the worst case each modified basis bit could result
in one flipped sifted key bit). This strategy allows Eve to hide the substitution
of sifting messages in the usual noise on the quantum channel, since the fol-
lowing error correction step will also remove these small additional deviations.
Obviously, the larger the message length `, the easier Eve’s task is.
3.2.2 Correlating the sifted keys of Alice and Bob
Assume for the moment that Eve has intercepted the quantum bits from Alice
and has saved them into her quantum memory. Assume further that she man-
aged to fool Alice, so that Alice announces her the corresponding preparation
bases. Then Eve can measure the quantum bits and get Alice’s raw key.
The strongest of the presented attacks is based on the fact that once Eve
knows the raw key of Alice, she can by using a modification of Bob’s sifting
message ensure with high probability that the complete sifted key of Alice will
be almost identical to that of Bob (cf. description of Protocol 1 and step (Se”)
of the attack against it.).
Lemma 2 Let dA ∈R {0, 1}n be the raw key that Alice has used to prepare
her quantum bits. Once Eve knows dA she can determine bn/2c−k bits of any
fixed sifted key sE that she wants Alice to create with probability
Psuccsift-attack ≥ 1− exp
(
−2k
2
n
)
(1)
by replacing Bob’s sifting message with a message bA=E that she has prepared.
Eve’s attack will succeed if a subsequence of sE (derived by deleting some
elements without changing the order) of length at least bn/2c − k is also a
subsequence of dA. The proof and a simple and efficient algorithm to generate
bA=E is given in D. Note, that k = O(
√
n) is sufficient for Psuccsift-attack ≈ 1.
3.3 General remarks, protocol notation and settings used
Any successful attack is based on finding protocol modifications yielding com-
munication messages that collide with those of the legitimate parties under the
fixed hash function in the first (internal) stage of authentication throughout
the complete chain of the QKD protocol. Therefore, in contrast to the case
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Table 1 Summary of symbols used in the paper.
Symbol Description
A, B, E Legitimate parties: Alice, Bob; and eavesdropper Eve.
Q, C quantum channel, classical channel
bA (bE), dA (dE) Alice’s (Eve’s) string for bases choice and raw key, resp., used
for preparing the quantum states.
bB, dB Bob’s bases choice and measurement results (i.e. his raw key).
ρA (ρE) quantum state, prepared by Alice (Eve).
mack notification that a party has finished its measurements.
gK(·) keyed hash function with key K.
bX=Y string indicating the positions where the parties X and Y
successfully prepared and measured in the same basis.
sA (sB, sE) sifted key of Alice (Bob, Eve).
sE↔A (sE↔B) sifted key shared between Eve and Alice (Bob).
sˆB error corrected (reconciled) key of Bob.
sˆE↔A error corrected (reconciled) key that Eve shares with Alice.
KA (KB,KE) final key of Alice (Bob, Eve).
KE↔A (KE↔B) final key shared between Eve and Alice (Bob).
EC := {EC1, . . . , ECn} set of predefined parity check matrices, used for forward error
correction in different error rate regimes.
i index into the set EC, denoting the actual parity check ma-
trix ECi used.
CO description of (ITS) confirmation function.
P description of (ITS) privacy amplification function.
 error rate on Q.
fail notification that a partner should abort protocol.
of authentication by universal hashing, now QKD post-processing protocols
differing in the precise definition of their separate algorithmic steps (e.g. mode
of authentication — immediate or delayed, exact order of exchange of sifting
messages, whether error-correction bits are encrypted or not, etc.) become in-
equivalent and exhibit different types of vulnerabilities. For this reason each
attack discussed below is adapted to a specific protocol. Both the protocols
and the corresponding attacks are carefully and formally defined.
We consider exclusively but without loss of generality the case of BB84
QKD protocols, as the attacks we discuss are essentially independent of the
particular form of quantum communication. Moreover, all protocols that we
study are stated as prepare-and-measure ones. It is, however, straightforward
to adapt the attacks discussed below to the case of entanglement based pro-
tocols.
It is implicitly assumed that on receiving messages Alice and Bob check
their message tags for correctness, and that incorrect message tags lead them
to conclude that Eve is intercepting, and to abort the protocol. In case the mes-
sage authentication is UC-secure the resulting protocols are also UC-secure.
A collection of used symbols is given in Table 1.
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Alice
Bob
dA
bA
ρ
bB
(S1):
ρA
ACK
(S2):
mack, t1
(S3):
bA, t2
&
&
(S4):
bA=B, t3
sA
sB
Fig. 1 Protocol 1 (BB84, Quantum exchange and sifting only). Time flow is from left to
right. Single (double) lines represent classical (quantum) communication. Local protocol
actions are depicted by boxes: ρ depicts state preparation, the indicator is a quantum mea-
surement device, the ACK box denotes that Alice waits for Bob’s message until she continues
with the protocol, = denotes the calculation of identical bases, & denotes the filtering of
signals (in different bases).
3.4 Protocol 1 – BB84 with immediate message authentication – Alice sends
bases
We divide the protocol into two separate parts: (S) quantum state transmission
and sifting, and (P) post processing (consisting of error correction, confirma-
tion, and privacy amplification). Part (P) needs the result of (S) (i.e. the sifted
keys) as input.
3.4.1 State transmission and sifting (S)
SUMMARY: 3 classical messages are exchanged. Each classical message is
accompanied by a corresponding tag (keyed hash value, MAC).
1. Setup. A and B share the 3 keys K1,K2,K3.
2. Protocol messages. Let t1 := gK1(mack), t2 := gK2(b
A), and t3 := gK3(b
A=B)
be the authentication tags used in messages (S2), (S3), and (S4), resp.
(S1) A
Q−→ B : ρA
(S2) A
C←− B : mack, t1
(S3) A
C−→ B : bA, t2
(S4) A
C←− B : bA=B, t3
3. Protocol actions.
(Sa) A creates two random bit strings, her raw key dA, and the bases string
bA, dA, bA ∈r {0, 1}N . For all pairs of bits
(
dAk , b
A
k
)
A generates the
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corresponding quantum states ρAk ∈ {ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3}. Using Q, A sends
the quantum state ρA =
⊗N
k=1 ρ
A
k (“string” of all ρ
A
k ’s), i.e. (S1) to
B.
(Sb) B creates a random bases string bB ∈r {0, 1}N . B measures ρA in
bases bB and obtains dB ∈ {0, 1, empty}N , where empty corresponds
to no measurement result at B, e.g., due to absorption in the channel,
or the imperfection of the detectors. For all k with dBk = empty , B
sets bBk = empty .
(Sc) Using C, B sends an acknowledgement message (S2) to A.
(Sd) A waits until she has received (S2), ensuring that the measurements
have been finished before bases exchange is performed. Using C, A
sends (S3) to B.
(Se) B calculates a bit string bA=B, such that bA=Bk = 1, if b
A
k = b
B
k , and
bA=Bk = 0, otherwise, for 1 ≤ k ≤ N . B removes from dB all bits dBk
where bA=Bk = 0 and obtains s
B. Using C, B sends (S4) to A.
(Sf) A removes from dA all bits dAk where b
A=B
k = 0 and obtains s
A.
3.4.2 Post processing (P)
SUMMARY: 3 classical messages with MACs are exchanged.
1. Setup. A and B share 3 keys K4,K5,K6.
2. Protocol messages. Let TA = (i, ECi(s
A), CO,CO(sA)).
(P1) A
C−→ B : TA, gK4(TA)
(P2) A
C←− B : , gK5() / fail , gK5(fail)
(P3) A
C−→ B : PA, gK6(PA) / —–
3. Protocol actions.
(Pa) A estimates the parameters of Q (based on the error rate of previous
rounds or by choosing a default value), selects a corresponding forward
error correction algorithm ECi from a predefined set, and calculates
the syndrome ECi(s
A). A determines a confirmation function CO,
and calculates CO(sA). A sends (P1).
(Pb) B uses ECi and ECi(s
A) to correct sB resulting in sˆB. B uses CO
to calculate CO(sˆB). B checks whether CO(sˆB) = CO(sA). If the
identity holds, B calculates the error rate  and sends it to A (P2).
If not, B sends fail to A (P2) and aborts the protocol.
(Pc) If A receives , A determines a corresponding privacy amplification
function PA, calculates KA = PA(sA), and sends (P3). If A receives
fail she aborts the protocol.
(Pd) If B has not aborted in step (Pb), he now calculates KB = PA(sˆB).
With probability almost 1 (determined by the confirmation function
CO), KA = KB.
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3.4.3 Attack against Protocol 1
Eve replaces the quantum channel between Alice and Bob with ideal quantum
channels and her instrumentation to prepare, store, and (almost) perfectly
measure quantum states.
RESULT: Alice, Bob, and Eve share identical keys KA = KB = KE.
1. Notation.
b˜x: a string that deviates slightly from bx to reach a hash collision with a
given tag t [used in messages (S3’) and (S4’)].
2. Protocol messages and messages inserted by Eve (marked by ’). Let t1 :=
gK1(mack), t2 := gK2(b
A), and t3 := gK3(b
E=B) be the authentication tags
used in messages (S2)–(S4).
(S1) A
Q−→ E : ρA
(S1’) E
Q−→ B : ρE
(S2) A
C←− B : mack, t1
(S3) A
C−→ E : bA, t2
(S3’) E
C−→ B : b˜E, t2
(S4) E
C←− B : bE=B, t3
(S4’) A
C←− E : b˜A=E, t3
(P1) A
C−→ B : TA, gK4(TA)
(P2) A
C←− B : , gK5() / fail , gK5(fail)
(P3) A
C−→ B : PA, gK6(PA) / —–
3. Protocol and attack actions.
(Sa) A performs step (Sa) of the protocol (prepares ρA and sends it in
(S1)).
(Sa’) E intercepts (S1) from A and stores ρA in her quantum memory. Then
E performs exactly as A in step (a) of the protocol: E determines
random dE and bE, prepares a state ρE and sends it in (S1’) to B.
(Sb) B performs step (Sb) of the protocol measuring the state E has pre-
pared, ρE, instead of ρA, as in the protocol (in the following denoted
as ρA → ρE).
(Sc) B performs step (Sc) of the protocol, i.e. he sends (S2).
(Sd) A performs step (Sd) of the protocol. She sends (S3).
(Sd’) E intercepts (S3), i.e. bA and the corresponding tag t2, and measures
her quantum memory in bases bA and obtains an identical copy of
A’s raw key, dA.
(Sd”) E determines b˜E (e.g. using an exhaustive search), such that the in-
tercepted t2 validates b˜
E and dH(b˜
E, bE) is small (cf. Corollary 1), and
sends (S3’) to B.
(Se) B performs step (Se) of the protocol (bA → b˜E, bA=B → bE=B),
obtains sB and sends message (S4).
Attacks on QKD protocols that employ non-ITS authentication 15
(Se’) E intercepts (S4), i.e. bE=B and the corresponding tag t3. E removes
from dE all bits dEk where b
E=B
k = 0 and obtains s
E↔B ≈ sB (in
general sE↔B 6= sB because E had to send b˜E instead of her true
basis choice bE in step (Sd”)).
(Se”) Using the algorithm detailed in D.1, E searches for a subsequence
of dA that coincides with sE↔B and calculates bA=E such that in
A’s next step, (Sf), A would create sA ≈ sE↔B as her sifted key.
Typically E will have to allow for O(
√
n) bits that will be different
between sA = sE↔A and sE↔B (see Lemma 2).
(Se”’) As in step (Sd”) E determines b˜A=E with small Hamming distance to
bA=E, this time validated by t3 obtained in step (Se’), calculates the
actual sifted key of A, sE↔A ≈ sE↔B and sends (S4’) to A.
(Sf) A performs step (Sf) of the protocol (bA=B → b˜A=E) and obtains
sA = sE↔A.
Note: Eve has almost reached her goal, as sA = sE↔A ≈ sE↔B ≈ sB holds.
The subsequent error correction step allows her to reach KA = KE = KB:
(Pa) A performs step (Pa) of the protocol. Eve reads (P1), and uses the
syndrome to correct her sifted key (in case A’s preparation and/or
E’s quantum measurement and preparation are not 100% perfect, so
that sE↔A ≈ sA).
(Pb) B performs step (Pb) of the protocol: sA = sE↔A = sˆB.
(Pc) A performs step (Pc) of the protocol and obtains KA = PA(sA).
(Pc’) E reads (P3), the privacy amplification function PA. E calculates
KE = PA(sE↔A) = KA.
(Pd) B performs step (Pd) of the protocol: KA = KE = KB.
This attack completely breaks protocol 1. Eve has an identical copy of
Alice’s and Bob’s shared “secret” key. This is the strongest possible attack.
For instance, using her copy of the key, Eve can simply decrypt messages from,
and encrypt and/or authenticate new messages to both parties.
If this key is used to authenticate further QKD rounds, Eve can now con-
tinue with a much simpler impersonation attack, in which she does not have
to calculate hash collisions or use her quantum memory.
3.5 Protocol 2 – BB84 with delayed message authentication – Alice sends
bases
This protocol is very similar to Protocol 1, the difference is the authentication
method: the authentication is delayed and performed only at the end of the
protocol verifying the integrity of all messages. This, however, will change
details of our attack strategy: until the very last message we don’t have to
care about authentication, but at the end we attack the privacy amplification
matrix to get enough degrees of freedom to find collisions (step (Pc’), see
below).
SUMMARY: 7 classical messages are exchanged. A nonce is used to enforce
synchronization. The two last messages are authenticated with MACs.
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&
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sE
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Fig. 2 Interleaving attack against quantum exchange and sifting of Protocol 1, a QKD-
protocol with immediate authentication. Time flow is from left to right. Single (double)
lines represent classical (quantum) communication. See caption of Fig. 1 for a description
of boxes and symbols. The new boxes A1,2 denote the attack actions, described in protocol
steps (Se) through (Se”’). Employing quantum memory Eve manages to bring Alice and Bob
to distill a sifted key that she knows with probability approaching 1.
1. Notation. nB: random number (nonce), created by B.
2. Setup. A and B share two keys K1,K2.
3. Protocol messages. Let TA = (i, ECi(s
A), CO,CO(sA)),MA = (bA, TA, PA),
MB = (nB, bA=B, /fail).
(S1) A
Q−→ B : ρA
(S2) A
C←− B : nB
(S3) A
C−→ B : bA
(S4) A
C←− B : bA=B
(P1) A
C−→ B : TA
(P2) A
C←− B :  / fail , gK1(MB)
(P3) A
C−→ B : PA, gK2(MA) / —–
4. Protocol actions. Steps (Sa)–(Sf) and (Pa)–(Pd) are identical to that of
protocol 1, with the following exceptions: (a) only the two last messages of
the protocol, (P2) and (P3), [which are sent in step (Pb) and (Pc)] have
MACs attached that authenticate all messages from Bob to Alice and Alice
to Bob, respectively, (b) in step (Sc) the message (S2) contains a nonce
nB, a random number that is chosen by Bob and used to ensure that Bob
has finished measuring before the bases exchange starts. Using a fixed mack
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as in protocol 1 instead of the random nonce nB would allow for a trivial
attack.
3.5.1 Attack against Protocol 2 (Eve only attacks messages to Bob)
Eve replaces the quantum channel between Alice and Bob, with ideal quan-
tum channels and her instrumentation to prepare, store and perfectly measure
quantum states. The first part of the attack is similar to the attack against
protocol 1 but it differs in several essential instances. All steps from (Sa) to
(Sd’) are basically the same, but messages (S2) and (S3) are sent without
MACs. From now on the attack differs so that Eve can cope with the form
of postponed authentication utilized in protocol 2. In particular, we assume
that Eve cannot manipulate the message that contains the error rate  on the
quantum channel. This could be the case, for example, if  is encoded as 16 bit
integer: the existence of hash collisions is very unlikely, since it is impossible to
reach the needed Hamming distance of at least 19 (see Sec. 3.2). This in turn
implies, that Eve can also not manipulate any previous message from Bob to
Alice (since she does not know what value of  Bob will be transmitting, she
does not know which messages to prepare to get a hash collision). In particular,
Eve cannot modify the sifting message of Bob, which rules out an attack anal-
ogous to the attack against protocol 1, described above. Amazingly, although
Eve cannot modify any message from Bob to Alice, she can still mount the
most powerful attack (Alice, Bob, and Eve share the same key)!
RESULT: Alice, Bob, and Eve share identical keys KA = KB = KE.
1. Protocol messages and messages inserted by Eve (marked by ’). In addition
to the definitions in the protocol above, let t2 = gK2(M
A).
(S1) A
Q−→ E : ρA
(S1’) E
Q−→ B : ρE
(S2) A
C←− B : nB
(S3) A
C−→ E : bA
(S3’) E
C−→ B : bE
(S4) A
C←− B : bE=B
(P1) A
C−→ E : TA
(P1’) E
C−→ B : TE
(P2) A
C←− B :  / fail , gK1(MB)
(P3) A
C−→ E : PA, t2 / —–
(P3’) E
C−→ B : PE, t2 / —–
2. Protocol and attack actions.
(Sa) – (Sd’) Identical to those of protocol 1 (cf. Sec. 3.4.3), up to the absence
of authentication tags in the present protocol.
(Sd”) E performs step (Sd) of the protocol (bA → bE) and sends message (S3’)
to B.
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(Se) B performs step (Se) of the protocol (bA → bE), obtains bE=B and sB,
and sends message (S4).
(Se’) E reads message (S4), i.e. bE=B. She removes from dE all bits dEk for
k : bE=Bk = 0 and obtains s
E↔B = sB, possibly with noise.
(Sf) A performs step (Sf) of the protocol (bA=B → bE=B) and obtains sA.
(Sf’) E removes from the string dA (which she knows exactly) all bits dEk for
k : bE=Bk = 0 and obtains s
E↔A = sA.
Note: Eve now shares two keys with Alice and Bob respectively sA = sE↔A
and sE↔B = sB (or sE↔B ≈ sB as discussed above) but these keys are not
correlated. After the subsequent error correction step E already shares sˆA =
sˆE↔A and sˆE↔B = sˆB. Finally, attacking the privacy amplification step of
the protocol E succeeds in achieving her ultimate goal KA = KE = KB:
(Pa) A performs this step in the protocol and sends message (P1).
(Pa’) E intercepts (P1), produces TE = (i, ECi(s
E↔B), CO,CO(sE↔B))
and sends message (P1’) to B. (If E would anticipate an error between
her and B that is too low, she can artificially modify her sifted key
sE↔B to increase the error that B registers.)
(Pb) B performs step (Pb) of the protocol (TA → TE), obtains sˆB =
sE↔B, calculates the error rate, determines MB = (nB, bE=B, /fail),
where bA=B → bE=B and sends message (P2).
(Pc) A accepts the authenticity of all the messages she has received, i.e.
(S2), (S4), (P2), since E has not modified any message and performs
step (Pc) sending (P3).
(Pc’) E intercepts (P3). To break the authentication of (P3), E calcu-
lates another PA function PE, such that PE(sE↔B) = KA and
t2 = gK2(b
E, TE, PE). 1 To ensure the last condition it is sufficient
that the message (bE, TE, PE) = ME collides with MA under the
inner authentication hash function f , i.e f(ME) = f(MA). E sends
(P3’) to B. (If Eve would be satisfied with Alice and Bob having
different keys, both of which she knows, Eve only searches for any
PA function PE such that f(ME) = f(MA), but accepts KB =
PE(sE↔B) = KE↔B 6= KA = PA(sE↔A).)
(Pd) B accepts the authenticity of all the messages he has received, i.e.
(S3’), (P1’), (P3’), since he has received a valid tag (t2) and performs
the final step of the protocol to get KB = PE(sˆB) = KE = KA.
3.6 Protocol 3 – BB84 with immediate message authentication – Bob sends
bases
This protocol is a variant of protocol 1, also using immediate message au-
thentication. Only part (S), i.e. the quantum state transmission and sifting
is different: After measuring the quantum signals, instead of sending an ac-
knowledge message as in protocol 1, Bob sends his bases information to Alice
1 In C we demonstrate that for typical scenarios the probability that in step (Pc’) a useful
PA function PE for Eve exists is almost one.
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(implicitly acknowledging that he has finished his measurements). Alice replies
with her basis information.
3.6.1 State transmission and sifting
SUMMARY: 2 classical messages with MACs are exchanged.
1. Setup. A and B share two keys K1,K2.
2. Protocol messages.
(S1) A
Q−→ B : ρA
(S2) A
C←− B : bB, gK1(bB)
(S3) A
C−→ B : bA=B, gK2(bA=B)
3. Protocol actions.
(Sa) same as (Sa) in protocol 1: A creates two random bit strings, dA, bA ∈r
{0, 1}N . For each pair (dAk , bAk ) A generates the corresponding quan-
tum state ρAk ∈ {ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3}. Using Q, A sends the quantum state
ρA =
⊗N
k=1 ρ
A
k (“string” of all ρ
A
k ’s), i.e. (S1), to B.
(Sb) same as (Sb) in protocol 1: B creates a random bit string bB ∈r
{0, 1}N . B measures ρA in bases bB and obtains dB ∈ {0, 1, empty}N
as result. For all k with dBk = empty , B sets b
B
k = empty .
(Sc) Using C, B sends (S2), i.e. bB, to A.
(Sd) A waits until she has received (S2). A calculates the bit string bA=B,
such that bA=Bk = 1 if b
A
k = b
B
k , and b
A=B
k = 0, otherwise. A removes
from dA all bits dAk where b
A=B
k = 0 and obtains s
A.
(Se) Using C, A sends (S3), i.e. bA=B, to B.
(Sf) B removes from dB all bits dBk where b
A=B
k = 0 and obtains s
B.
3.6.2 Post processing (P)
This part is completely identical to part (P) of protocol 1, cf. Sec. 3.4.2.
3.6.3 Attack against Protocol 3
Eve replaces the quantum channel between Alice and Bob, with ideal quan-
tum channels and her instrumentation. Eve must be able to prepare and per-
fectly measure quantum states. She does not need a quantum memory to
perform her attack. Essentially this attack is a modified version of the well
known intercept-resend attack, whereby the currently discussed authentica-
tion mechanism allows Eve to conceal the difference between the sifted keys
of Alice and Bob (of roughly 25%) in the postprocessing stage of the protocol.
RESULT: Alice, Bob, and Eve share identical keys KA = KB = KE.
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1. Notation.
b˜x: a string that deviates slightly from bx to reach a hash collision with a
given tag t [used in messages (S2’) and (S3’)].
2. Protocol messages and messages inserted by Eve (marked by ’). Let t1 =
gK1(b
B), t2 = gK2(b
A=E), t3 = gK3(T
A), t5 = gK5(P
A).
(S1) A
Q−→ E : ρA
(S1’) E
Q−→ B : ρE
(S2) E
C←− B : bB, t1
(S2’) A
C←− E : b˜E, t1
(S3) A
C−→ E : bA=E, t2
(S3’) E
C−→ B : b˜E=B, t2
(P1) A
C−→ E : TA, t3
(P1’) E
C−→ B : TE, t3
(P2) A
C←− B : , gK4() / fail , gK4(fail)
(P3) A
C−→ E : PA, t5 / —–
(P3’) E
C−→ B : PE, t5 / —–
3. Protocol and attack actions.
(Sa) A performs step (Sa) of the protocol.
(Sa’) E creates a random bit strings, bE ∈r {0, 1}N . E intercepts (S1) from
A and measures ρA in bases bE, she obtains dE. For each pair
(
dEk , b
E
k
)
,
E prepares the corresponding quantum state ρEk and sends (S1’) to B.
(Sb) B performs step (Sb) of the protocol (ρA → ρE).
(Sc) B performs step (Sc) of the protocol, i.e. he sends (S2).
(Sd’) E intercepts (S2) and performs A’s step (Sd) of the protocol(bA=B →
bE=B, bA → bE) and obtains her sifted key with Bob, sE↔B.
(Sc’) E calculates b˜E, such that the intercepted t1 validates b˜
E and dH(b˜
E, bE)
is small. She then performs B’s step (Sc) of the protocol (bB → b˜E),
i.e. she sends (S2’) to A.
(Sd) A performs step (Sd) of the protocol (bB → b˜E, bA=B → bA=E),
she obtains bA=E (which is defined by bA=Ek = 1, if b
A
k = b˜
E
k , and
bA=Ek = 0, otherwise) and s
A.
(Se) A performs step (Se) of the protocol (bA=B → bA=E), i.e. she sends
(S3).
(Sf’) E intercepts (S3) and performs B’s step (Sf) of the protocol (dB → dE,
bA=B → bA=E) and obtains (approximately) her sifted key with A,
sE↔A. (There are small deviations between sA and sE↔A since E had
to send b˜E instead of bE).
(Se’) E determines the string bE=B, such that bE=Bk = 1, if b
E
k = b
B
k , and
bE=Bk = 0, otherwise. E then calculates the string b˜
E=B, such that the
intercepted t2 validates b˜
E=B and dH(b˜
E=B, bE=B) is small. Now E
performs A’s step (Se) of the protocol (bA=B → b˜E=B), i.e. she sends
(S3’).
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(Sf) B performs step (Sf) of the protocol (bA=B → b˜E=B), and obtains his
sifted key, sB (there are small deviations between sB and sE↔B since
E had to send b˜E=B instead of bE=B).
Note: Now Eve possesses almost identical copies of Alice’s and Bob’s keys,
respectively: sA ≈ sE↔A and sE↔B ≈ sB (while sA and sB will differ
in approximately 25% of the bits due to Eve’s quantum intercept-resend
attack). The subsequent steps allow Eve to transform her key sE↔A into
sA and make Bob transform his key sB into a new key sˆB, which she knows:
(Pa) A performs step (Pa) of the protocol, i.e. she sends (P1).
(Pb’) E performs B’s step (Pb) of the protocol, i.e. she intercepts (P1) to
learn the syndrome ECi(s
A), and corrects her sifted key sE↔A to sA.
(Pa’) E performs A’s step (Pa) of the protocol, but modifies her key sE↔B
such that ECE(sE↔B) will allow B to correct his sifted key to the
modified sE↔B and that the resulting (P1’), i.e. TE = (i, ECi(sE↔B), CO,CO(sE↔B)),
is compatible with tag t3. E sends (P1’).
(Pb) B performs step (Pb) of the protocol, i.e. he corrects his sifted key
sB and obtains sˆB. Now Eve shares sA with Alice, and sˆB with Bob.
(Pc) A performs step (Pc) of the protocol, i.e. she determines a privacy
amplification function PA, applies it to her sifted key, and obtains
KA = PA(sA). A sends (P3).
(Pc’) E intercepts (P3) to learn the privacy amplification function PA and
thus A’s final key KA. E calculates another PA function PE such
that PE(sˆB) = KA and that (P3’) is compatible with tag t5.
2
(Pd) B performs step (Pd) of the protocol, i.e. he applies PE and gets
KB = PE(sˆB) = KA.
Again, Eve managed to break the protocol completely, as she knows Alice’s
and Bob’s shared “secret” key.
3.7 Implications of protocol modifications on the presented attacks
3.7.1 No separate step for transmitting the privacy amplification function
In [14, p. 83] it has been proposed that the privacy amplification function
PA is not transmitted in a separate protocol step (our step (P3)), but can
be constructed from previously exchanged basis information ([24] uses this
method to counter the attack described in [8]). However, no strict security
proof of the resulting protocol has ever been put forward.
For the discussed two-step authentication our attack against protocol 1
still works without step (P3) since we don’t attack the post processing step at
all. Also the attack against protocol 3 still works without step (P3), but is not
so powerful. Since Eve has complete knowledge of the basis information, she
can just apply the respective PA function individually to her keys with Alice
2 In C we demonstrate that for typical scenarios the probability that in step (Pc’) a useful
PA function PE for Eve exists is almost one.
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and Bob. Consequently, Eve will know Alice’s and Bob’s final keys which will
be, however, different.
The case of protocol 2 is slightly more complicated but the outcome is iden-
tical to that of protocol 3. In this case the last communication message from
Alice to Bob is (P1), and, naturally, it has to be extended to carry also the au-
thentication tag t2 = gK2(M
A), whereby now MA = (bA, TA). Eve will have
to modify her attack. Now she has to look for an error correction syndrome TE,
so that ME = (bE, TE), collides with MA under the inner authentication hash
function f , i.e f(ME) = f(MA). To do so Eve is free to modify her sifted key
sE↔B → s˜E↔B, so that TE = (i, ECi(s˜E↔B), CO,CO(s˜E↔B)) would ensure
the required collision. As in the case of protocol 3 Eve has complete knowledge
of the bases of Alice and Bob. She can again apply the respective PA func-
tions independently and obtain the final keys of Alice and Bob, which differ
one from the other.
3.7.2 One-time pad encryption of the error correction syndrome
Ref. [19] presented a protocol in which parity bits are encrypted with a one-
time pad (using key that is preshared or generated in previous rounds). Since
Alice and Bob use in addition a (large) key which is not known to Eve, one
could expect that attacks will be impossible. Nevertheless, we will briefly out-
line modified attacks against such a protocol.
If Eve uses a quantum memory in her attack she will learn Alice’s complete
sifted key. Therefore, she can calculate the exact syndrome, that Alice will
OTP-encrypt and send. From the plain and encrypted syndrome, Eve gets the
one-time pad, encrypts her syndrome with it and continues the attack.
If Eve performs an attack without quantum memory, her and Alice’s sifted
key will differ in a small number of bits (the Hamming distance w of the
two keys), the positions of which are known to Eve. Thus Eve can create the
set of all possible sifted keys of Alice of size 2w, which is only a very small
subset of all possible keys of length approximately n/2, and is also smaller
than the set of all possible message tags. Then Eve decides randomly to take
one element of this set to be Alice’s sifted key. Compared to a guess without
previous knowledge she could dramatically increase her chances of guessing
correctly, although the probability is still quite low, i.e. p = 2−w. Assuming
she has guessed correctly, she can now calculate the syndrome that Alice has
sent, and thus get also the one-time pad. She uses it then for encrypting the
syndrome that she sends to Bob.
3.8 Overview of attack approaches for adversaries with and without quantum
memory
Up to now we have presented three attacks in which Eve on receiving a proto-
col message from Alice (Bob) sends either the original message or a modified
one to Bob (Alice). In Sec. 3.9 we will present a different kind of attack. The
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attacks presented so far are not isolated cases of adversary success strategies
in the case of weak authentication that uses the approach of Ref. [24]. The
attacks are actually made up of building blocks that can be combined and
applied in a wide variety of settings. We illustrate this fact by presenting a
systematic overview of successful attacks against a range of protocols com-
prising the cases of sifting being started by Alice or Bob, authentication being
immediate or delayed. Moreover for all the cases we distinguish between two
levels of adversary resources: i) “classical only”, i.e. sufficiently high computing
power or ii) “quantum and classical”, i.e. a combination of quantum resources
(quantum memory) and classical ones (as in i)). These attacks are summarized
in Tables 2 and 3. The attacks are not described in full detail and the tables
focus on the adversary activities alone. The full attacks, can however be easily
deduced by comparing the table contents referring to Attacks 1, 2 and 3 with
the detailed description for these cases, given above.
Furthermore, using arguments similar to those presented in Section 3.7 one
can construct attacks against modified versions of these protocols, including
encryption of error-correction information and reuse of common, sifting-stage
randomness for privacy amplification without communication.
3.9 Another attack against Protocol 2 (Eve attacks in both directions)
In our previous attacks Eve substitutes certain messages but sticks to the orig-
inal message order of the protocol. In the following attack Eve exchanges a
sequence of messages with Alice first. When she needs to send an authentica-
tion tag to Alice, she starts her communication with Bob and continues until
she obtains the necessary tag from him. Then Eve continues her communica-
tion with Alice.
In contrast to the previous attack against protocol 2 (cf. Sec. 3.5.1) this
attack allows Eve to modify also messages that are sent to Alice.
1. Protocol messages and messages inserted by Eve (marked by ’). Let t1 :=
gK1(M
B), and remember that t2 := gK2(M
A).
(S1) A
Q−→ E : ρA
(S2’) A
C←− E : nE
(S3) A
C−→ E : bA
(S1’) E
Q−→ B : ρE = ρA
(S2) E
C←− B : nB
(S3’) E
C−→ B : bE = bA
(S4) E
C←− B : bE=B
(P1’) E
C−→ B : TE
(P2) E
C←− B :  / fail , t1
(S4’) A
C←− E : b˜E=B
(P1) A
C−→ E : TA
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(P2’) A
C←− E :  / fail , t1
(P3) A
C−→ E : PA, t2 / —–
(P3’) E
C−→ B : PE, t2 / —–
2. Protocol and attack actions.
(Sa) A performs step (Sa) of the protocol (prepares ρA and sends it in (S1)).
(Sc’) E intercepts (S1) from A and stores ρA in her quantum memory. E
sends an arbitrary number nE (S2’) to A to trigger A’s next message.
(Sd) A performs step (Sd) of the protocol: she sends (S3), i.e. bA.
(Sd’) E intercepts (S3), measures ρA in A’s preparation bases bA, and obtains
A’s rawkey dA.
(Sa’) Using dA and bA, E prepares an identical copy of ρA and sends it (S1’)
to B.
(Sb) , (Sc), (Sd”), (Se), (Sf’) E (instead of A) and B follow the protocol–
whereby sending (S2), (S3’), (S4)–until they obtain their sifted keys
sE ≈ sB.
(Pa’) , (Pb) E (instead of A) and B follow the protocol–whereby sending
(P1’),(P2)–and reconcile their sifted keys.
On receiving (P2) E has learned MB and the tag t1 and can now continue
her communication with A.
(Se’) E calculates a message b˜E=B such that (i) it is close to bE=B and (ii)
MA←E := (nE, b˜E=B, /fail) collides with MB under the inner hash
function f , i.e. f(MA←E) = f(MB). E sends b˜E=B to A (S4’).
(Sf) , (Pa) A calculates her sifted key sA, and sends (P1).
(Pb’) E intercepts (P1) and can correct small errors introduced during quan-
tum storage or measurement of ρA. Using the original tag t1, E forwards
(P2’)=(P2) to A.
(Pc) Since f(MA←E) = f(MB), A accepts the message as authentic, calcu-
lates PA and KA = PA(sA), and sends (P3) with tag t2.
(Pc’) E calculates a PA function PE (and obtains KE = PE(sˆB)) such that
(i) PE(sˆB) = KA, and (ii) ME→B := (bE, TE, PE) collides with MA
under f . E calculates PE(sˆB), and sends (P3’) with tag t2 to B.
(Pd) B calculates KB = PE(sˆB).
Eve shares a common “secret” key with Alice and Bob. In case that E can-
not achieve condition (i) in step (Pc’) she will get two individual keys with
A and B. In both cases, protocol 2 is completely broken by the presented
attack.
3.10 Discussion of attacks
The degree of success of the eavesdropper varies from protocol to protocol
and ranges from a complete three party identity of the generated key – KA =
KE = KB, to “separate worlds” outcome – KA = KE↔A 6= KE↔B = KB
(e.g. in a case of privacy amplification with no communication), to a successful
attack over one of the legitimate parties (calling for a subsequent isolation of
the other)– i.e. KA 6= KE = KB. Moreover the success can be achieved
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either deterministically or sometimes only probabilistically as in certain cases
of encrypted transmission of error correction information.
This analysis underlines what was already mentioned in Section 3.3. As
the attack mechanism fundamentally requires finding hash collisions of the
internal authentication function that are useful to the eavesdropper, the dif-
ferent protocol versions discussed above, allow inequivalent optimal adversarial
approaches. As it is to be expected, the availability of quantum resources sim-
plifies the task of the eavesdropper but does not automatically lead to more
powerful attacks. On the other hand immediate authentication also provides a
leverage to the attacker as she does not have to correlate all her actions across
the post-processing chain. This gives the somewhat counter-intuitive observa-
tion, that fewer authentication tags result in more difficulty for the attacker if
he wants to keep the original message order! Furthermore sifting initiated by
Bob also poses more difficulties to Eve as she can not learn the full informa-
tion of Alice as is in the opposite case. Finally if part of the postprocessing
information remains unknown to the eavesdropper, as in the case of encrypted
reconciliation, then a deterministically successful attack strategy is not always
guaranteed.
With all this said it must be underlined that Eve can find useful collisions
only if she can fake the protocol communication by hiding her modifications in
the typically available random degrees of freedom. If such are unavailable or
strongly reduced (as e.g. in the case of protocols with delayed authentication
or with communication-less privacy amplification) the room for attack is nar-
rowed resulting in a number of cases in “separate world” or even “one-sided”
adversarial success. Still in all discussed cases there always exists an attack
strategy that renders the corresponding protocol version insecure.
4 Countermeasures
We will now propose a countermeasure that mitigates or, at a cost, prohibits
the attacks exemplified in the previous section. One could consider encrypt-
ing parts of the communication between Alice and Bob [1, 19], but we will
concentrate on strengthening the two-step authentication below. As we shall
see, there are a number of possibilities ranging from increasing Eve’s need for
large computational power, all the way to information-theoretic security. As
can be expected, the cost of this security improvement comes in the form of
an increased secret key consumption.
Let us first consider the main enabler of the attacks presented in the previ-
ous section. The reason that the attacks are possible is that when Eve receives
(or intercepts) Alice’s message, she can immediately check if her message mE
coincides with Alice’s under the publicly known hash function f . If not, Eve
is free to choose another message m˜E that does coincide with Alice’s under f ,
although in some situations there is a small price to pay as described above. To
prohibit this we should make it difficult or impossible for Eve to check for this
coincidence. The essence of our proposed countermeasure is to use an extra
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bitsequence to make the output of the public hash function difficult to predict,
or even secret, to Eve. This is done in the following way: prepend an extra
bitsequence S to the message and authenticate the result. Instead of using the
tag t = gK(m) = hK(f(m)), use the tag t = gK(S||m) = hK(f(S||m)). If, for
example, S is random and secret to Eve, then the output f(S||m) will also be
secret to Eve, and she will not be able to search for coincidences in the above
manner.
It should be stressed that S should be prepended to the message before
applying f . The bitsequence S should not be concatenated with f(m). The
reason for this is fairly obvious. If S is concatenated with f(m) so that t =
hK(S||f(m)) or t = hK(f(m)||S), then Eve can still apply her original attack
strategy. All Eve needs in this case is still to find a message that collides with
Alice’s message under f . We should also stress that for certain classes of hash
functions, prepending S to the message has advantages over appending to m
(so that t = hK(f(m||S))). When using iterative hash functions like SHA-1
to calculate f(m||S), Eve can ignore S and search instead for a message m′
such that f(m′) = f(m). This is known as a partial-message collision attack,
see Chapter 5 in Ref. [13]. If f is computed iteratively, f(m′) = f(m) will
automatically give f(m′||S) = f(m||S) (with appropriate block lengths). This
is prohibited by prepending S instead, to use f(S||m).
Of course, a random secret S would consume secret key, and this may
not be desirable. Selecting S can be done in a few ways, and these are the
alternatives (including a random secret S):
A salt, a random but fixed public bitstring, per device or per link. This would
not make Eve’s task much harder, but it would help a little in certain
situations: for some messages, such as preparation and/or measurement
settings, Eve does not need to use a random bitstring. She can use a fixed
(random-looking) bitstring and for that message, a pre-calculated table of
messages with low Hamming distance and their corresponding intermediate
tags [1]. Even though a full table might have an excessive number of entries
(2256 is a large number), a partial table could ease Eve’s calculational load
(as in a rainbow table), or alternatively increase her probability of success.
A salt would force Eve to create the table anew for each device or link.
A nonce, a random public bitstring, per authentication attempt. This may
seem like a big improvement because it seems Eve cannot use a pre-
calculated table, forcing her to make the calculations online. However, the
nonce needs to be transmitted from Alice to Bob or vice versa, and is
not separately authenticated, since this would need secret key better used
elsewhere. A nonce can therefore be changed in transit by Eve, and this
increases her possibilities. Authenticating a message from Alice to Bob,
there are two sub-alternatives:
a) The nonce is generated by Alice and sent to Bob together with the tag,
and Eve can change it in transit.
b) The nonce is generated by Bob and sent to Alice after he has received
the message. One alternative for Eve is to commit to a message so
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that she can receive the nonce from Bob, and then change the nonce in
transit. In effect, she can now change Alice’s message since that contains
the nonce.
In both cases, Eve needs to find a collision online, but Eve now has a
message part that she can change to any value she desires. Therefore, her
attack is easier in this setup, not more difficult.
Fixed secret key, a random but fixed secret bitstring, per device or per link.
In this case, Eve cannot apply the previous attack on the authentication,
because she cannot check for collisions directly since f(S||m) is secret to
her. To search for a message m′ useful to Eve (i.e., having low Hamming
distance to mE) such that f(S||m′) = f(S||m) has maximal probability
(given the distribution of S) is computationally very costly. Moreover, we
expect this maximal probability to be very low, but an upper bound is
difficult to obtain and depends on details of the hash function, see below.
As regards using a fixed secret [2], if Eve has partial knowledge, no matter
how small, on the secret key K identifying hK , this information will ac-
cumulate over the rounds as information on S. Remember that after the
initial pre-shared key is used up, K will consist of QKD-generated key that
is -perfect (the trace distance between the probability distribution of the
key and the uniform distribution is ), where  is nonzero. Therefore, af-
ter a large number of rounds, this reduces to using a random fixed public
bitstring (salt) as discussed above.
Secret key, a random secret bitstring, per authentication attempt. Here also,
Eve cannot apply the previous attack on the authentication, because she
cannot check for collisions directly since f(S||m) is secret to her. The situ-
ation is almost identical to the fixed secret key case but Eve’s task is even
harder as she cannot accumulate information on S.
This countermeasure is simple to implement, and the last alternative above
seems preferable, if only the key consumption is low. Choosing S to be of the
same size as the tag gives a high computational load on Eve, and is efficient in
terms of key consumption. It is, however, difficult to estimate the probability
of success for Eve, if she has large computational power.
Let us examine what conditions need to be fulfilled to make the two-step
authentication ITS. If the last alternative above is used, it is clear that we want
a low probability of collision for a random value of S. And this is obtained if
two distinct messages collide under f only for a small number of values of S.
More formally, let S be the set of values of S. Then, if for any two distinct m1,
m2 ∈ M |{S ∈ S : f(S||m1) = f(S||m2)}| ≤ ′|S|, we automatically have a
low collision probability. A close look at the above condition would tell us that
it is precisely the condition for a family of hash functions indexed by S to be
′-AU2 (see E). The following theorem states that this condition is necessary
and sufficient to restore ITS.
Theorem 1 Let M, Z and T be finite sets. Let F be a family of hash func-
tions from M to Z, H a family of SU2 hash functions from Z to T , and
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G := H ◦ F , where ◦ stands for element-wise composition. Then G is -ASU2
if and only if F is ′-AU2, where  = ′(1− 1/|T |) + 1/|T |.
The proof can be found in E. Thus, to make the two-step authentication
ITS, we should construct our fixed public hash function f with the help of an
AU2 hash function family F as follows:
f(S||m) = fS(m), fS ∈ F . (2)
In words, f separates S from the concatenation S||m and uses it as index
to select from the hash function family F an individual member fS which is
applied to the original message m.
Theorem 1 makes it possible to relate the message length log |M|, the
security parameter ′, and the key consumption of the system. Let us aim for
a final -ASU2 family with  = 2/|T | − 1/|T |2, i.e., ′ = 1/|T |. Then, the
bound by Nguyen and Roscoe [23] is tight:
|F| > |T |⌈ log |M|/ log |Z| − 1⌉. (3)
In [23] there are two lower bounds, but both can be written in this way. The
bound applies when ′|Z| > 1+log |Z|/(log |M|− log |Z|). The optimal family
[23] is that of polynomial evaluation hashing over finite fields [11, 17, 32].
Therefore, using polynomial hashing with |F| = |Z|, we can authenticate
messages as long as
log |M| <
( |Z|
|T | + 1
)
log |Z|. (4)
For example, if |Z| = 2256, |T | = 264 and  = 2−63 − 2−128, then messages
of length log |M| < 2200 ≈ 1060 bits can be authenticated. The second step
of the authentication uses an SU2 hash function Z → T , which needs a key
of length at least log |Z| + log |T | bits [10, 31]. Thus, the total required key
length is 2 log |Z| + log |T |, in this case 576 bits. By adjusting |Z| to the
maximum message length, this scheme can authenticate one terabit (petabit,
exabit, zettabit, yottabit) of data using 260 (280, 298, 318, 338) bits of secret
key.
This construction makes the two-stage authentication ITS at the price of
increasing the key consumption slightly. There are other efficient constructions
of ASU2 hash functions as well, see e.g., [3, 9, 10, 18]. Some of these authen-
ticate message of arbitrary length with fixed key consumption at the price
of a varying , while others have fixed  but varying key consumption. They
also vary in terms of their computational speed. The numbers are in the same
range as the above presented ITS authentication, and all mentioned schemes
are reasonably efficient.
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5 Conclusions
The main conclusion of our extensive analysis is: do not use non-ITS authen-
tication in QKD if you want to achieve ITS security. This may sound rather
obvious but nevertheless in our oppinion it is always good to know what ex-
actly goes wrong if you break the rules.
So, we have presented a comprehensive case study of attacks that compro-
mise QKD in the non-ITS authentication setting of [24], that creates message
tags by composing an inner public hash function with an outer function from a
strongly universal hashing (SU2) family. From the point of view of the attacker,
who is equipped with unbounded computing resources, this composition has
the following properties: (i) inserting a randomly chosen message or substi-
tuting messages with a randomly chosen message is as hard as in the SU2
case and thus cannot be used in attacks, (ii) but more interestingly, substi-
tuting a message with another that collides under the public hash function
will always work. As has been shown previously [24] property (i) does prohibit
straightforward MITM attacks (cf. Definition 1).
The sophisticated MITM attacks dicussed here capitalize on property (ii)
to successfully target many QKD protocol versions: protocols that use individ-
ual authentication of each message, or that use delayed authentication of all
messages, protocols where Bob sends an acknowledgement message to trigger
Alice’s sifting message (containing her bases choice), or where Bob directly
sends his bases choice, see Tables 2 and 3. All the attacks are enabled by the
fact that the number of messages that collide with a given protocol message
(or sequence of messages) of typically at least several hundred bits is extremely
huge. Therefore, almost certainly (see Sec. 3.2) there exists at least one col-
liding message that allows the eavesdropper to perform her attack. In some
attacks Eve needs less computing resources if she possesses quantum memory.
We stress that the discussed attack pattern is not restricted to one single
instance, the specific authentication mechanism of Ref. [24] that we study here.
We conjecture, that whenever property (ii) holds, i.e. collisions can be found,
and the protocol does not use additional secret key [1, 25] (e.g. for encryption
of messages) the adversary can compromise the security of the key generated
by QKD, following an interleaving approach along the lines of that discussed
in this paper.
The countermeasures discussed in this paper use more secret key, specifi-
cally to prevent finding collisions. Prepending secret key material to the mes-
sage, before applying the public hash function, will increase the computational
resources needed for a successful attack substantially, at a low cost in terms
of key material.
Furthermore, we can achieve Universally-Composable Information-Theoretic
Security of the authentication scheme of [24] by replacing the publicly known
hash function with an Almost Universal2 function family. This requirement is
necessary and sufficient for ITS of the two step authentication; the necessity
of this condition is also a new result of this paper.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 Let us assume that f maps all messages inM randomly onto Z. Then the prob-
ability that at least one of the messages in M is validated by the given tag t = hK(f(mA))
is
Psucccoll = Pr
{
∃mE ∈M : hK(f(mE)) = t)
}
> 1− exp (−|M||Z|−1) .
Proof By assumption, the probability that f maps any (randomly chosen) message m ofM
onto any fixed value z of Z is 1/|Z|:
m ∈RM,∀z ∈ Z : Pr {f(m) = z} = 1/|Z|. (5)
Applying hK to f(m) and z in the argument of Pr (which potentially increases the value of
the probability), setting z = f(mA), and using t = hK(f(m
A)) we obtain
m ∈RM : Pr {hK(f(m)) = t} ≥ 1/|Z|. (6)
Consequently, the probability that t authenticates at least one message of all |M| different
messages in M is at least 1 − (1− |Z|−1)|M|, and using that (1 − 1/n)n < e−1 for n > 1
finishes the proof.
If desired, 1/|Z| can be replaced by any lower bound on the probability to allow for non-
uniform distributions.
B Proof of Corollary 1
Corollary 1 Let B be the closed ball of all messages m having a Hamming distance to mE
not exceeding w:
B =
{
m : dH(m,m
E) ≤ w
}
,
and let us assume that f maps all messages in B randomly onto Z. Then the probability
that at least one of the messages in B is validated by the given tag t = hK(f(mA)) is
Psucccoll = Pr
{
∃m˜E ∈ B : hK(f(m˜E)) = t)
}
> 1− exp (−|B||Z|−1) .
For simplicity we can loosen the bound and replace |B| by ( `
w
)
< |B|, where ` is the length
of the binary message mE.
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Proof The proof follows from Lemma 1 by setting M = B.
Finally, |B| = ∑wk=0 (`k) > ( `w).
If desired, 1/|Z| can be replaced by any lower bound on the probability to allow for non-
uniform distributions.
C Calculation of success probability in step (Pc’) of attacks 2 and 3
C.1 Attack 2–Toeplitz based hashing
The probability that step (Pc’) is successful, i.e. that a message PE exists that fulfills
PE(sE↔B) = KA and t2 = gK2 (b
E, TE, PE), depends on the length of the message PE: a
short message PE means less freedom for Eve to find collisions. Currently, owing to its low
computational complexity universal hashing with Toeplitz matrices is predominantly used
for PA. The smallest known Toeplitz matrix based hashing family HT : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
consists of 2n−1 different functions [15]. Note, that it has 2m different images and that for
any x 6= 0, 2n−m−1 different functions exist in HT that map x to any y.
Thus we need len(sE↔B) − 1 bit for the description of a particular function of this
family (here len(·) denotes the length of a binary string) and the size of the set P of all
PA functions that fulfill the first condition, i.e. P := {PE : PE(sE↔B) = KA}, is given by
|P| = 2len(sE↔B)−len(KA)−1.
Combining the fixed messages bE and TE with all messages from P we form the set
of all triples M := {(bE, TE, PE) : PE ∈ P} that fulfill the first condition. Obviously,
|M| = |P|. Now Lemma 1 gives us a lower bound for the success probability for finding a
message in M that collides with MA, i.e. Psucccoll = Pr
{∃mE ∈M : hK2 (f(mE)) = t2)} >
1− exp (−|M|/|Z|).
If we assume again that |Z| = 2256 this means that shrinking the corrected key sE↔B
by 260 bit or more to obtain the final key KA gives Eve a chance of 1−exp(−2260−1/2256 =
1− exp(−8) ≥ 0.999 to find a collision.
C.2 Attack 3–Toeplitz based hashing
For attack 3 the argumentation is completely analogous: the only difference is that we
directly define M := {PE : PE(sˆB) = KA} and that t2 is replaced with t5.
C.3 Discussion for other PA functions
Besides universal hashing other strong randomness extractors can be used for PA. For ex-
ample, asymptotically, Trevisan’s extractor needs a shorter description (seed) to select a
particular function. In such a case, it might be impossible for Eve to fulfill both conditions.
Nevertheless, she can accept that she shares different keys with Alice and Bob and only
search for a PE such that the MAC is accepted. In that case it would be only necessary
that the seed is at least 260 bit long. To the best of our knowledge all strong extractors with
useful parameters need much more than 260 bit of seed.
D Subsequence problem
Eve is given two fixed bit sequences, sE↔B (sifted key that Eve wants to achieve) and dA
(the raw key of Alice). Her goal is to find a subsequence of dA that coincides with sE.
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D.1 Algorithm that finds a subsequence
First we give a simple algorithm that takes two sequences s = s1|s2| . . . |sm, S = S1|S2| . . . |Sn
as inputs and returns the index set J = {j1, . . . , jm} = {ji : Sji = si} if s is a subsequence
of S (denoted s 4 S).
Algorithm A find subsequence(s, S)
Input: two non-empty binary sequences s and S.
Output: index set J if s is a subsequence of S, else ∅.
i← 1, j ← 1, m← length(s), n← length(S), J ← ∅
do
if si = Sj then // we found one bit of s
J ← J ∪ {j} // store position
i← i+ 1 // compare next bit of s
endif
j ← j + 1 // compare next bit of S
while (i ≤ m and j ≤ n) // neither end of s nor end of S reached
if i ≤ m then return ∅ endif // end of s not reached, but end of S reached
return J
D.2 Probability for finding a subsequence in a random sequence
We assume that both sequences consist of i.i.d. Bernoulli trials with p(0) = p(1) = 1/2 and
calculate the (success) probability that s 4 S.
s 4 S iff S is of the form
S = s¯1| . . . |s¯1|s1|s¯2| . . . |s¯2|s2| . . . |s¯m| . . . |s¯m|sm|x1|x2| . . . . (7)
Here, s¯j denotes the negation of sj (written above as sj to improve readability), while
each xi can independently take value 0 or 1. All sequences s¯j | . . . |s¯j are optional. Let S be
the number of different valid sequences, i.e. sequences S, that contain s as a subsequence.
Obviously S does not depend on s, but only on m and n. To calculate S we can therefore
choose s to be the all zero sequence of length m. Consequently, S is equal to the number of
different binary sequences of length n that contain at least m zeroes. The success probability
Prob{s 4 S} = S/2n = 2−n
n∑
l=m
(n
l
)
. (8)
D.3 Application to Eve’s attack
Note that Eve wants to find the sifted key sE↔B in Alice’s raw key dA. If both bases are
used with equal probability (as in standard symmetric BB84), then m ≈ n/2. Obviously,
Prob{s 4 S} > 1
2
⇐ m ≤ bn/2c. (9)
However, it is not necessary, that s is an exact subsequence of S. We can allow for some
errors that will be removed during the subsequent error correction step. Using Hoeffding’s
inequality (Theorem 1 in Ref. [16]) we can give a non-tight (but exponential) lower bound
on Prob{s˜ 4 S} if we allow for approximately k errors in the resulting subsequence s˜:
Prob{s˜ 4 S} ≥ 1− exp
(
−2k
2
n
)
⇐ m˜ = bn/2c − k. (10)
Here, only m˜ bits of s form a subsequence of S. For moderate values of k this probability
reaches almost unity.
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E Universal hash functions and proof of Theorem 1
In the following we give definitions of (Almost) Universal2 and Strongly Universal2 hash
function families; see e.g., [31].
Definition 3 (-Almost Universal2 (-AU2) hash functions) Let M and T be finite
sets. A family H of hash functions fromM to T is -Almost Universal2 if there exist at most
|H| hash functions h ∈ H such that h(m1) = h(m2) for any two distinct m1,m2 ∈M.
If  = 1/|T |, then H is called Universal2 (U2).
Definition 4 (-Almost Strongly Universal2 (-ASU2) hash functions) LetM and
T be finite sets. A family H of hash functions from M to T is -ASU2 if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(a) The number of hash functions in H that takes an arbitrary m1 ∈ M to an arbitrary
t1 ∈ T is exactly |H|/|T |.
(b) The fraction of those functions that also takes an arbitrary m2 6= m1 in M to an
arbitrary t2 ∈ T (possibly equal to t1) is at most .
If  = 1/|T |, then H is called Strongly Universal2 (SU2).
Below, we have restated Theorem 1 together with its proof. This theorem states that
the composition of a hash function family with an SU2 family will form an ASU2 family
if and only if the first family in the composition is AU2. The “if” part follows from the
composition theorem [31], but the below proof simultaneously handles “if and only if”.
Theorem 1 Let M, Z and T be finite sets. Let F be a family of hash functions from
M to Z, H a family of SU2 hash functions from Z to T , and G := H ◦ F , where ◦
stands for element-wise composition. Then G is -ASU2 if and only if F is ′-AU2, where
 = ′(1− 1/|T |) + 1/|T |.
Proof For G to be -ASU2, there are two requirements (Definition 4). The first, on |{g :
g(m) = t}|, needs no properties of F , because, for any m ∈M and t ∈ T ,
|{g : g(m) = t}| =
∑
z
|{f : f(m) = z}||{h : h(z) = t}|
=
∑
z
|{f : f(m) = z}| |H||T | = |F|
|H|
|T | =
|G|
|T | .
(11)
The second requirement is a bound for
|{g : g(m1) = t1, g(m2) = t2}|
=
∑
z
|{f : f(m1) = f(m2) = z}||{h : h(z) = t1, h(z) = t2}|
+
∑
z1 6=z2
|{f : f(m1) = z1, f(m2) = z2}||{h : h(z1) = t1, h(z2) = t2}|,
(12)
for any two distinct m1, m2 ∈M. If t1 6= t2, the first term above will be zero because h(z)
will never equal both t1 and t2. If instead t1 = t2 = t, the first term simplifies to∑
z
|{f : f(m1) = f(m2) = z}||{h : h(z) = t}| = |{f : f(m1) = f(m2)}| |H||T | . (13)
The second term is∑
z1 6=z2
|{f : f(m1) = z1, f(m2) = z2}||{h : h(z1) = t1, h(z2) = t2}|
=
(|F| − |{f : f(m1) = f(m2)}|) |H||T |2
(14)
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and this can be bounded by |G|/|T |2 only using properties of H. Thus, if t1 = t2 the first
term needs a bound for collisions within F , while the second only needs properties of H,
and we obtain
|{g : g(m1) = t1, g(m2) = t2}| = |{f : f(m1) = f(m2)}|
(
δt1,t2 −
1
|T |
) |H|
|T | +
|G|
|T |2 , (15)
where δt1,t2 = 1 if t1 = t2 and 0 otherwise. This makes the second requirement on G
equivalent to F being ′-AU2:
|{g : g(m1) = t1, g(m2) = t2}| ≤  |G||T | = 
′
(
1− 1|T |
) |G|
|T | +
|G|
|T |2
⇐⇒
|{f : f(m1) = f(m2)}| ≤ ′|F|.
(16)
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Table 2 Overview of attacks against the sifting stage of different protocol variants. QM
denotes whether Eve uses a quantum memory in her attack. The notation “Protocol 1–3”
refers to the protocols and corresponding attacks described in full detail above. ρE(bE, dE)
denotes the quantum state which encodes the bit string dE in bases bE. ≈ denotes that two
sifted keys deviate only weakly (error correction can reconcile them). 6≈ denotes a deviation
of two sifted keys by typically 25%. If not otherwise stated, E performs sifting with the
appropriate bases of A and B.
QM Immediate Authentication Delayed Authentication†
A
se
n
d
s
b
a
se
s
Y Protocol 1–Interleaving attack:
E stores ρA in quantum memory,
E sends random ρE(bE, dE) to B,
E substitutes b˜E for bA,
E measures ρA in bA and learns dA,
E calculates b˜A=E to force
sE↔A ≈ sE↔B,
E substitutes b˜A=E for bE=B.
Protocol 2–Interleaving attack:
E stores ρA in quantum memory,
E sends random ρE(bE, dE) to B,
E substitutes bE for bA,
E measures ρA in bA and learns dA,
E listens to bE=B (no substitution!).
sA = sE↔A ≈ sE↔B ≈ sB
(Case 1)
sA = sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B = sB
(Case 2)
N Intercept-resend attack:
E measures ρA in bE and gets dE,
E sends ρE(bE, dE) to B,
E substitutes b˜E for bA,
E substitutes b˜A=E for bA=B.
One-sided intercept-resend attack:
E measures ρA in bE and gets dE,
E sends ρE(bE, dE) to B,
E substitutes bE for bA,
E listens to bE=B (no substitution!).
sA ≈ sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B ≈ sB
(Case 3)
sA 6≈ sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B = sB
(Case 4)
B
se
n
d
s
b
a
se
s
Y Interleaving attack:
E stores ρA in quantum memory,
E sends random ρE(bE, dE) to B,
E listens to bB (no substitution!),
E measures ρA in bB,
E listens to bA=B, determines
sE↔A,
E substitutes b˜E=B for bA=B.
Interleaving attack:
E stores ρA in quantum memory,
E sends random ρE(bE, dE) to B,
E listens to bB (no substitution!),
E measures ρA in bB,
E listens to bA=B, determines
sE↔A,
E substitutes bE=B for bA=B.
sA = sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B ≈ sB
(Case 3)
sA = sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B = sB
(Case 2)
N Protocol 3–Intercept-resend attack:
E measures ρA in bE and gets dE,
E sends ρE(bE, dE) to B,
E substitutes b˜E for bB,
E substitutes b˜E=B for bA=B.
One-sided intercept-resend attack:
E measures ρA in bE and gets dE,
E sends ρE(bE, dE) to B,
E listens to bB (no substitution!),
E substitutes bE=B for bA=B.
sA ≈ sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B ≈ sB
(Case 3)
sA 6≈ sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B = sB
(Case 4)
†In these cases E does not substitute messages from B to A.
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Table 3 Overview of four attack classes against the protocol stages after sifting. The attacks
pertain to the output of sifting, which according to Table 2, yields four different types of
correlations between the sifted keys of A, E, and B: two for immediate (cases 1, 3) and two
for delayed authentication (cases 2, 4), respectively. Note, that for the sake of simplicity we
do not use the “hat” notation for error corrected keys.
Immediate Authentication Delayed Authentication†
sA = sE↔A ≈ sE↔B ≈ sB (Case 1)
EC: E does nothing.
result: sA = sE↔A = sB
PA: E listens to the PA function PA,
E calculates KE := PA(sE↔A).
result: KA = KE = KB
sA = sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B = sB (Case 2)
EC: E intercepts TA,
E calculates TE,
E sends TE to B.
result: sA = sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B = sB
PA: E intercepts the PA function PA,
E calculates KE := PA(sE↔A),
E calculates new PA function PE,
E sends PE to B.
result: KA = KE = KB
sA ≈ sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B ≈ sB (Case 3)
EC: E intercepts TA,
E corrects sE↔A, obtains sA,
E modifies sE↔B, calculates TE,
E sends TE to B.
result: sA = sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B = sB
PA: E intercepts the PA function PA,
E calculates KE := PA(sE↔A),
E calculates new PA function PE,
E sends PE to B.
result: KA = KE = KB
sA 6≈ sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B = sB (Case 4)
EC: E intercepts TA,
E calculates TE,
E sends TE to B.
result: sA 6≈ sE↔A 6≈ sE↔B = sB
PA: E intercepts the PA function PA,
E calculates KE := PA(sE↔A),
E calculates new PA function PE,
E sends PE to B.
result: KA 6= KE = KB
†In these cases E does not substitute messages from B to A.
